Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Caucasus Survey

ISSN: 2376-1199 (Print) 2376-1202 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcau20

Lack of rule of law as a push factor leading to violent radicalization in the North Caucasus (2002–2015)

Adrián Tarín-Sanz & Marta Ter-Ferrer

To cite this article: Adrián Tarín-Sanz & Marta Ter-Ferrer (2018): Lack of rule of law as a push factor leading to violent radicalization in the North Caucasus (2002–2015), Caucasus Survey, DOI: 10.1080/23761199.2018.1471843

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/23761199.2018.1471843

Published online: 17 May 2018.

CAUCASUS SURVEY
https://doi.org/10.1080/23761199.2018.1471843

Lack of rule of law as a push factor leading to violent radicalization in the North Caucasus (2002–2015)

Adrián Tarín-Sanz[a,b] and Marta Ter-Ferrer[a]

[a]Dept. COMPOLITICAS, Eurasian Observatory, Seville, Spain; [b]Faculty of Social Communication, Central University of Ecuador, Quito, Ecuador

ABSTRACT

Following the collapse of the USSR, a violent jihadist organization called the Caucasus Emirate emerged in Russia, before subsequently splitting up in 2015 when most of its members swore allegiance to the Islamic State. The root causes of violent radicalization are complex but, according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), there are certain universal "push factors": perceptions of injustice, human rights violations, lack of rule of law, social-political exclusion and widespread corruption. Since all the factors coincide in the North Caucasus, the hypothesis of this study is that the lack of rule of law has been one of the main push factors leading to violent extremism in the specific case of the Republic of Ingushetia.

ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 7 October 2017
Accepted 30 April 2018

KEYWORDS
Ingushetia; North Caucasus; radicalization; rule of law; jihadism

Introduction: research literature review

Violent conflict has marked the recent history of the North Caucasus. The republic that has aroused the greatest interest in this regard is undoubtedly Chechnya, where successive wars and the speed with which its nationalist insurgency embraced Salafism have been comprehensively discussed in the academic literature (Schaefer 2010; Garner 2013; Galeotti 2014; Pokalova 2015). Acknowledging the many causal factors at play, this article focuses on how ordinary people in the Republic of Ingushetia affected by conflict regard the lack of rule of law as one of the most persuasive, while ignoring other influential circumstances.

It should be noted from the outset that the contentious nature of the rule of law as a concept is a limiting factor here (Carlin 2012; Burgess 2017). Theories fall into two main categories: thin and thick. The thin theory "emphasizes the formal or instrumental aspects of the rule of law", that is, "those features that any legal system allegedly must possess to function effectively as a system of laws". Thick theories incorporate "into rule of law elements of political morality such as particular economic arrangements, forms of government or conceptions of human rights." (Peerenboom 2003, 50–51). There is greater consensus on the first of these theories – doubtless because, as can be observed, it contains fewer aspects – which explains why the rule of law is habitually understood as a mere system of checks and balances ensuring that no citizen, regardless of his or her

CONTACT Adrián Tarín-Sanz artarin@uce.edu.ec

social position, ethnicity, gender, religion, etc., is above the law, along with the consolidation of a judiciary completely independent of executive power (McCarthy and Un 2017).

This study conceptualizes the lack of rule of law inspired by the report *Preventing Violent Extremism through Inclusive Development and the Promotion of Tolerance and Respect for Diversity*, drawn up by the United Nations (UN 2016), which regards its promotion as one of the main strategies for preventing violent radicalization. The lack of rule of law, which is understood here as arbitrariness when enforcing the law, is one of the main causes of radicalization (International Crisis Group 2013).

Returning to the review of the literature on Chechnya (Rivas Otero and Tarín Sanz 2017), the weakness of the government of Aslan Maskhadov, whose job it was to manage the complex interwar period and the second outbreak of war, is usually identified as one of the main motives, along with his failure to monopolize the violence, with the consequent proliferation of paramilitary groups. With regard to Dagestan – the North Caucasus republic that has attracted the most attention after Chechnya – there are also papers that associate the lack of rule of law with violent radicalization. According to Kisriev and Ware (2005) Moscow's plans to replace the local administrations could have exacerbated the republic's Islamization.[1] In another recent study, Ratelle and Souleimanov (2017) concluded, after interviewing a number of militants, ex-militants and their families, that the desire towards revenge for the humiliation to which they had been subjected by state institutions – in particular, the security forces – was a decisive factor in the territory's radicalization, and that its religious expression was more a consequence than a cause. This calls into question the widely held assumption that Islam is always the fundamental reason behind radicalism. The study of radicalism in another North Caucasus republic, namely Kabardino-Balkaria, is a field of research still in its infancy, which in the past five years or so has aroused the interest of several specialists (Markedonov 2011; O'Loughlin, Holland, and Witmer 2011; Shterin and Yarlykapov 2011). Some of these new works contextualize this violence and radicalization in terms of the security force's inflexibility and government arbitrariness commonplace in the lack of rule of law (Fagan 2014; Koehler, Gunya, and Alkhazurov 2016). Returning to the Republic of Ingushetia, the object of study here, there was an escalation of violence from 2002 onwards (O'Loughlin, Holland, and Witmer 2011), whose subsequent propagation has also been addressed (Campana and Ratelle 2014). The current research is driven by the fact that the rule of law factor has received even less attention in the case of Ingushetia than in neighbouring units of the North Caucasus.

The aim of this work is, therefore, to analyze the perception that the lack of rule of law played as a push factor leading to violent radicalization in Ingushetia during the period 2002–2015, notwithstanding the existence of other solid reasons which, however, the respondents we have consulted played down. Although there is already a study that points in this direction (IISS 2008), its insights are general and tell us little about the self-perception of the populace. To this end, an ethnographic method with a qualitative approach was employed, whose main techniques were questionnaires and structured open-ended interviews with 31 citizens affected by the conflict.

Theoretical literature review

The notion of radicalization has acquired greater visibility in the public space, above all since political Islam has gone from strength to strength in several contemporary conflicts

(Pisoiu 2013), but its conceptualization is plural and complex. Even though the aim of this work is not to discuss the different definitions of the phenomenon – which has already been reliably done (Sedgwick 2010) – how it should be understood here deserves an explanation. To this end, the approach taken by Bartlett and Miller (2012, 2), which distinguishes between "violent" and "non-violent" radicalization, was employed. The former, which has been used as a benchmark here, refers to "a process by which individuals come to undertake or directly aid or abet terrorist activity," while for the latter, which is not addressed here, it is "the process by which individuals come to hold radical views in relation to the status quo but do not undertake, aid, or abet terrorist activity." Thus, the idea is to discern the impact of the lack of rule of law on ordinary Ingush people as a push factor leading to violent radicalization.

This general opinion contrasts with the hegemonic discourse of the mass media which, when interpreting violent Islamic radicalization, tend to magnify the religious factor. However, in some critical academic circles the debate is currently revolving around other matters that could shed more light on the issue. From the analyst Olivier Roy (11 January 2016) to the philosopher Santiago Alba Rico (2015), many researchers claim that the violent radicalization of some Muslims is due to causes shared by other political radicalisms (Pisoiu 2013). As a matter of fact, McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) conducted a study in which they identified the main reasons that might drive someone to tread the path of political violence, and religion did not figure in any of the variables, this being eclipsed by more universal options such as "personal victimization" or "political grievance". On many occasions, these reasons demonstrate that not even a comprehensive ideological or religious grounding is necessary to defend a political cause with violence (Wesley 2008).

To assume this approach is to accept that, in addition to religious arguments, there are other decisive political, social, economic, charismatic or even casual factors that should be borne in mind when analyzing violent Islamic radicalization.[2] In this manner, the cause being defended is more a consequence of radicalization than its cause or, in other words, the Islamic apparel is a cultural, ideological or aesthetic expression of the process of political radicalization.

This can be seen even more clearly when the radicalized are migrants. In her study, Sirseloudi (2012) shows how religion has ended up becoming a cornerstone of the radicalization of the Turkish diaspora in Germany to the extent that it has served to connect the community, a sort of identity refuge – a trait that gives meaning to the collective – in the face of an unsatisfactory structural reality. The conditions of exclusion of Central Asian migrants in Russia force them, in some way, to deepen their religious roots and, at worst, to react violently against the system (Ter 2016). While, for her part, Sagramoso (2007) tackles this question in the North Caucasus, identifying structural reasons – authoritarian regimes, relative socioeconomic deprivation, rapid demographic growth – which, when added to other circumstantial ones – the availability of weapons technology, the existence of a training and support network or the spread of attractive ideologies – might have an influence on the radicalization.[3]

Identifying the causes of radicalization is crucial to prevent it. Academically speaking, this is the sense in which the field of studies relating to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is formulated, to wit, "a preventative approach to counterterrorism: an approach intended to preclude individuals from engaging in, or materially supporting,

ideologically motivated violence" (Williams, Horgan, and Evans 2016). Even though, as in the case of the rule of law concept, CVE lacks a clearly delimited and nuanced definition (Heydemann 2014), several studies point in the same direction: the building of resilience. This issue is best encapsulated by Stevan Weine (2012, 63) who, drawing on other authors, offers a summary of what scientifically speaking we already know about resilience and CVE:

> 1. You can be resilient to some risks but not to others (…) 2. Resilience is neither entirely individual nor entirely social, but an interactive combination (…) 3. When youth face risks from socioeconomic and sociocultural adversities, their family is the strongest buffer against the associated risks.

What makes this perspective crucial is its insistence that, like the rule of law, CVE must be a concept with a social and political origin rather than only having an individual or administrative basis, which is how many criminal codes can be interpreted:

> resilience is not just a property of individuals but of families, communities, organizations, networks, and societies. (…) Family resilience entails connectedness, values, and flexibility. Community resilience includes shared problem-solving and safe community spaces for youth to hang out under adult supervision. Institutional resilience involves flexibility and trustworthiness. (Weine et al. 2013, 328)

From this perspective, the recommendations of these experts frequently focus on building counter-narratives to extremism (Gielen 2017), promoting healthy friendships (Williams, Horgan, and Evans 2016) and creating specific educational programmes (Ghosh et al. 2017) or public health policies (Weine et al. 2017).

Nevertheless, governments sometimes apply counterproductive CVE measures based on a purely public order approach, whose most visible manifestation is the exclusive use of police or military action (hard CVE). This is true of most of the CVE policies implemented in the North Caucasus. Instead of following the recommendations of Akhmet Yarlykapov (2010), for example, to combat corruption and build a multinational Russian identity sensitive to the national realities of the Caucasus, most measures tended to be repressive, generating feelings of abuse and having the opposite effect (Sagramoso 2007; Malashenko and Yarlykapov 2009). "The indiscriminate attacks and repressive measures perpetrated by the local authorities against suspected terrorist and pious Muslims encouraged many young individuals to turn to violence in order to avenge their own sufferings and the loss of their loved ones" (Sagramoso 2012, 579). In this way, the religious channeling of radicalization in the North Caucasus is viewed as being profoundly conditioned by the cultural milieu[4] and the political currents of the moment; in other societies, it is plausible that a radicalism originating from similar causes might have adopted different aesthetic and political forms.

In a nutshell, the empirical line of inquiry of this work with respect to radicalization in Ingushetia is consistent with the theoretical literature that claims that this process is strongly influenced by religious conditions, without this implying any type of determinism (Pisoiu 2013). This does not mean to say that, under the same structural conditions, all subjects and collectives must become radicalized, and much less adopt the same political stances. Nonetheless, it does indeed seem appropriate to contest the idea that Islam possesses special characteristics favouring political radicalization.

Violent radicalization in the North Caucasus: a brief overview

The insurgency in the North Caucasus has its roots in the first war between the Russian government and the Chechen secessionist forces, unleashed in 1994 three years after the unilateral declaration of Chechen independence. But after two devastating wars, what was at first a nationalist conflict turned into a more religious one. Consequently, several cells had already been created in Dagestan (Shariat Jamaat), Kabardino-Balkaria (Yarmuk Jamaat), Ingushetia (Sharia Jamaat), Karachay-Cherkessia (Karachai Jamaat) and in areas inhabited by Circassians (Nogai Jamaat). This was how the Chechen conflict spread to neighbouring republics. The conflict between Russia and Chechnya became one between Russia and the armed Islamic insurgency across the whole region (Vachagaev 2017).

Even though this resume is useful for framing violent radicalization in the region, the difficulties in analyzing the Northern Caucasus must be considered. It is indeed possible to distinguish genuine factors in each republic, such as Ingushetia, which help to explain this phenomenon, especially considering that this insurgency should be described as a network of conflicts stemming from local problems, rather than a unified region-wide conflict (Kuchins, Malarkey, and Markedonov 2011). It should also be borne in mind that these armed groups operated in circumscribed areas in response to republic-specific grievances and concerns, which makes it necessary to analyze each one of these contexts for an understanding of the local dynamics of violence (O'Loughlin, Holland, and Witmer 2011).

The case of Ingushetia

Recent history and socioeconomic situation

With an area of 3000 km^2, Ingushetia is a tiny republic in the North Caucasus and the smallest of Russia's federal subjects. Located between Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia, the republic is inhabited by 412,000 people, most of whom are of Vainakh ancestry, a people related to the Chechens and Sunni Muslims following the Sufi tradition.

In 1992, barely a year after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this region was the theatre of an armed conflict triggered by a territorial dispute with neighbouring North Ossetia over the control of the Prigorodny district, which had formed part of Ingushetia until 1944, when it was transferred to the jurisdiction of North Ossetia. In 1992, Ingush militants sought to regain the territory by force. Ossetia was backed by Moscow and the violent incidents that followed left 583 people dead and, according to various estimates, approximately 30,000–60,000 Ingush were forced to abandon their homes (Sokirianskaya 2004). Prigorodny is today part of North Ossetia.

With rampant unemployment, inadequate social services and infrastructure, and little to offer in the way of industry or agriculture, Ingushetia is one of the most underdeveloped regions of the Russian Federation. From 2009 until the present day, 83–96% of the yearly Ingush budget is bankrolled by Moscow (Sotkasiira 2016). Furthermore, Ingushetia is republic with the highest unemployment rate: in January 2016, 30.7% of the active population was jobless. It also has the lowest average per capita income: 13,337 roubles ($206) in 2015 (Rosstat 2016). In addition to its socioeconomic plight, in the 1990s Ingushetia felt the brunt of the Chechen refugee crisis. According to official figures, between 1999 and 2003 the republic sheltered as many as 308,000 displaced Chechens in tent camps and

temporary or private residences (ICG 2012). It is suspected that dozens of Chechen rebels posing as refugees continued to operate in Ingushetia (Sagramoso 2012).

During the two Russian-Chechen Wars, Ingushetia, governed at the time by Ruslan Aushev, was the only republic that continued to receive Chechen refugees, thus blatantly disregarding Moscow's orders. During Aushev's term in office, radical Islam failed to gain a foothold in the republic and he prevented federal counterterrorism operations from being carried out on Ingush soil (Ibidem). But when he resigned in 2001 and was succeeded by FSB General Murat Zyazikov, who had strong support from the Kremlin, the situation changed significantly. During Zyazikov's presidency, the use of counterinsurgency techniques hitherto restricted to Chechnya also started to be employed in Ingushetia. Initially, counterterrorism operations (which included abductions, torture and extrajudicial killings) only affected Chechen refugees, but later these began to involve the Ingush population (Memorial 2005).

The tactics employed by the Russian armed forces led to a feeling of helplessness among the Ingush who were unable to prevent, by legal means, these systematic abuses. The most radical members of the Islamic insurgence, who had already started to hold sway in Chechnya and other republics, took advantage of this situation, recruiting new adepts from among the dissatisfied and alienated youth who desired to take vengeance on the security forces. In this regard, several non-Chechen fighters, who had fought alongside Basayev in Chechnya and had received instruction at al-Khattab's Islamic training camps in Serzhen-Yurt, were sent to Ingushetia to recruit and train insurgent cells (McGregor 2006). However, the importance of the foreign combatants in the violent radicalization of the Ingush was limited, due mainly to ethnic distrust and the disparities between the local needs and Islamic interpretations imported from the Middle East (Pokalova 2017).

Several forceful and charismatic local personalities, such as Anzor Astemirov, Yasin Rasulov and Said Buryatsky, had a greater influence on the preaching of Salafism and recourse to arms in the North Caucasus (Sagramoso 2012). Although we will return to the latter further on, special mention should first go to Ilyas Gorchkhanov, a close associate of Basayev, due to the leading role that he had played in the creation of the Ingush *jamaat*. This *jamaat* was responsible for some of the most important attacks occurring in the republic (Malashenko and Yarlykapov 2009), thus boosting recruitment to a certain extent. Thus, from 2002, the violence steadily increased in Ingushetia. Accordingly,

> […] our dataset indicates the steady rise in violence after Zyazikov came to power in 2002. In 2002, we recorded 70 events in Ingushetia; this figure rose slightly (to 90 events) in 2003, before dramatically increasing to 157 events the following year. In 2008—the year Zyazikov resigned from the presidency—there were 357 violent events, with a subsequent drop-off in the years since, to 309 events in 2009 and 192 events in 2010. (O'Loughlin, Holland, and Witmer 2011, 11)

The upsurge in violence in 2004 could mainly be explained by the fact that, during the night of 22 June, a group of insurgents led by Basayev and Gorchkhanov seized the towns of Nazran and Karabulak, killing 78 people and injuring over 100. This attack provoked a strong reaction from the security forces (HRW 2008). Besides his proven military skills, Gorchkhanov played a decisive role in devising a pan-Caucasian and Muslim government – then called the Caucasian Front, but later the Caucasus Emirate (CE) – to

replace the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI) of an eminently secular and Chechen nature (Tarín Sanz 2017).

After his death in 2005, Gorchkhanov was followed by Ali Taziev, also known as Emir Magas. As a matter of fact, Magas was already a fully-fledged combatant before the creation of the CE. By then, he had been fully acknowledged by Basayev as the leader of the Ingush militants (Pokalova 2015). According to the Russian security services, he participated in the massive attack on Ingushetia in June 2004 and the hostage-taking in Beslan, North Ossetia (Dzutsati 2012).

In 2006, the violence peaked in Ingushetia due both to the repressive local context and to the evolution of the North Caucasus insurgency, and many were those who compared the charisma of Magas with that of the recently deceased Basayev (Hahn 2008). Under the supervision of Gorchkhanov and Magas, the Ingush *jamaat*, in addition to remaining "a core group of small clandestine units capable of supporting the broader Chechen-led war effort," had "volunteers from other ethnic and sub-ethnic groups, including Chechens, Balkars and a handful of Ossetians" (Moore 2012, 1794). The popularity of Magas was such that in 2007 Doku Umarov named him Military Emir of the CE.

Lastly, because of his relevant position in Ingushetia – he would die there – it is important to mention the preacher and guerrilla fighter Said Buryatsky, born a long way from the Caucasus but, nonetheless, regarded as one of the ideologists of the CE (Kurbanov 2011). Buryatsky enjoyed the full confidence of Umarov, who entrusted him with the reactivation of the suicide brigade *Riyad-us Saliheen*, but his popularity was due above all to his oratory skills, precisely because in his speeches he associated the power of attraction of the CE with his ability to offer a solution to the lack of rule of law in the North Caucasus:

> Some village lads […] proved ill prepared for the university and flunked out. Or they could not find the desired jobs because the construction industry and agriculture, which were the traditional Chechen occupations for previous generations, had grown highly competitive with the mass influx of newly impoverished migrant workers from republics such as the Ukraine and Moldova. Instead of sinking into penury or returning home as miserable failures, these Chechen youths found or fought their way into the dangerous but fabulously lucrative and romanticized arena of violent entrepreneurship. (Leahy 2010, 251)

In this sense, it should be noted that effective violent radicalization, besides a certain degree of material deprivation that could provoke a certain feeling of injustice or grievance with respect to other groups – which King and Taylor (2011) call "relative deprivation" – requires charismatic leaders – such as Gorchkhanov, Magas or Buryatsky, among others – to channel that dissatisfaction, as in all populist movements (Laclau and Mouffe 1987).

Yevkurov's counterinsurgency approach

The spiral of violence that seemed to have engulfed Ingushetia did not subside until Zyazikov was removed from the presidency in 2008. He was replaced by Yunus-bek Yevkurov, an officer of the Russian military intelligence. Although Yevkurov also hailed from the security apparatus, since occupying his post there was a change of tack to address the issue of counterterrorism. As with his predecessor, he also lacked any formal control over the local police or federal security forces. But although his capacity to control counterterrorism operations in his republic was limited, from the word go he made it clear that he was not going to stand by and do nothing.

In the first month of his presidency, he held meetings with both the political opposition leaders (*Interfax*, 4 November 2008) and Ingush civil society organizations dedicated to reporting human rights violations (*Zaprava*, 26 November 2008), as well as with the families of the insurgents (Memorial, 2 December 2008). He also organized a roundtable with the participation of members of the law enforcement agencies, the families of young people kidnapped or murdered by members of the security forces, and those of law enforcement agents murdered by the insurgents. The aim was to begin a process of reconciliation (Memorial, 10 June 2009).

Soon after this meeting, Yevkurov was badly wounded when a suicide bomber detonated a car packed with explosives as the presidential convoy drove past. He survived and continued to implement policies along the same lines. He personally mediated between families who had sworn blood vengeance against each other to get them to resolve their grievances in a peaceful manner (*Kommersant*, 16 January 2009). And on 28 January 2010, he also intervened in a special operation to persuade Yunus Mutsolgov, an alleged insurgent, to surrender (Memorial, 30 January 2010). Yevkurov has always stressed that dialogue is necessary to pacify the republic:

> I think a dialogue is the right thing to do, not the use of force, no matter what some people will say. A dialogue of the people with the authorities and the authorities with the people, and a thought-out work with criminals. This method fundamentally differs from the ones we used in 2007–2009. (*Kavkaz Uzel*, 13 June 2012)

In this respect, in May 2011 he signed a decree for establishing a commission to help people who abandoned their extremist activities to live a peaceful life. Formed by representatives of the Ingush government, the Parliament, the Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Bar Association, the muftiate of the republic, local ombudsmen and civil society organizations, according to official figures 67 insurgents had returned to civilian life since its creation up until 2015 (*Gazeta*, 8 May 2015).

While these "soft" counterterrorism measures were being implemented, during 2010 the security forces managed to deal an important blow to the armed insurgency. In June 2010, Emir Magas was captured and, two months later, his successor Emir Adam was arrested as well. By fostering dialogue between the different actors, while capturing key militants of the Ingush insurgency, the security situation thus began to improve. Versus the 357 violent events registered in 2008, there were only 309 the following year and 192 in 2010 (O'Loughlin, Holland, and Witmer 2011), after which the situation has stabilized to a significant degree. Nowadays, almost no young people are joining the insurgency, while 16 were reported killed in 2015 (*Kavkaz Uzel 2016*).

Data and methods

To analyses the perception of the lack of rule of law in the processes of violent radicalization in Ingushetia during the period 2002–2015, an ethnographic method with a qualitative approach was employed. This choice was motivated by its successful application in other similar studies, such as that conducted by Kenney (2011) in the Islamic quarter of El Príncipe, Ceuta (Spain), in which he interviewed several residents about their socioeconomic situation and the causes behind the adoption of extreme religious postures. Furthermore, he also set out a well-informed defense of ethnography as a

resource for supplementing bibliographic analyses in this respect, given that it is a method that gives voice to the subjects under study. Ethnography has also been used to assess this type of violent radicalization in the works of Ratelle and Souleimanov (2017) focusing on Dagestan; that of Campana and Ratelle (2014), which also includes a field survey based on interviews conducted throughout the North Caucasus; and that of Fagan (2014), in which the respondents were people living in Kabardino-Balkaria and Adygea.

In this work, two techniques were employed: questionnaires[5] and structured open-ended interviews with 31 citizens related to the conflict in Ingushetia, including 28 residents, one Ingush living in Europe, one Muscovite female journalist specializing in the republic, and a Chechen journalist who had worked in Ingushetia for several years. For a better interpretation of the replies, an effort was made to gather information about the gender, age, profession and place of residence of the respondents – in some instances they chose to withhold this information. As to the questionnaire used here, the respondents were asked to arrange in order of importance a closed list of possible causes that they believed were relevant to the process of violent radicalization. The interviews, on the other hand, were conducted to discover more freely their opinions on Yevkurov's management of the conflict, other possible causes of violent radicalization and alternative measures to deal with the problem (Table 1).

Analysis

When completing the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to arrange hierarchically a closed list of possible causes behind violent radicalization in Ingushetia. This list, based on the one proposed by the UN (2016), includes the following: "lack of rule of law", "perception of injustices", "human rights violations", "social-political exclusion", "widespread corruption" and "religious factors".

Although these categories have been established and endorsed by international organizations, it must be said that many of them are interrelated, thus blurring boundaries and hindering research. When compared, for example, with the classification proposed by Pokalova (2017), there would be other push factors like ideology, corruption, the economy and the persecution of the Wahhabis. As can be seen, the latter could fall into at least three of the categories proposed by the UN: perceptions of injustice, social-political exclusion and religious factors. Nonetheless, and although the reality is more complex and difficult to divide into defined portions, the use of these categories contributes to operationalize research.

As shown in Figure 1, the causes that appear most frequently at or near the top of the list are "lack of rule of law" and "perception of injustices". Moreover, these two items are

Table 1. Respondents' demographic data.

Residence		Gender		Age		Occupation	
Local	28	Man	11	18–29	06	Student	05
Abroad	03	Woman	04	30–59	15	Empl/Unem	12
		Anon.	16	60–	04	Activist	04
				Anon.	06	Pensioner	04
						Anon.	06
Total							31

very seldom ranked at or near the bottom of the list. To a certain extent this is coherent with the ongoing theoretical analysis, according to which political reasons are more decisive than religious ones when explaining violent extremism in Ingushetia. As already mentioned above, King and Taylor (2011) have shown that one of the most common push factors leading to violent radicalization is the grievances or abuse felt by one collective with respect to another, which is unfairly privileged. So, while the respondents usually included "human rights violations" and "widespread corruption" in the middle of the list, none of them identified "social-political exclusion" as one of the main reasons, with most of them regarding it as one of the least important factors. This is striking insofar as it highlights the perception of injustice and reported police abuses, which were not always interpreted from the perspective of political repression but rather from a criminal and social one.

In this respect, one of the most polarized items to interpret is "religious factors". Even though eight respondents ranked it as the most influential cause, it also featured prominently at or near the bottom of the list, being most frequently found in first and last place, which seems to indicate that it is a controversial and polarized issue. It is important to recall here that most of the respondents were Muslims, for which reason a positive bias towards religion in their answers should not be overlooked, even though such a tendency – should it indeed exist – would support the thesis of this work.

Comparatively, the respondents' answers to the question, "Why do you think violent extremism increased in Ingushetia between 2002 and 2008?" coincided with the results. Most stressed various elements of the "lack of rule of law" as factors leading to an increase in violent radicalization. Socioeconomic underdevelopment and the lack of jobs for young people also stood out as root causes. In fact, the references to the lack of opportunities for the young in Ingushetia could be crucial here, bearing in mind the findings of Roy (2007), for whom radicalization in general, besides being an ideological phenomenon, is also a



Figure 1. Questionnaire.

generational one arising from a lack of prospects. While far less importance was attributed to religious factors (Figure 2).

As set out above, violent radicalization peaked in Ingushetia between 2002 and 2008, and an analysis of its context may shed some light on the possible reasons behind this. In this respect, most of the respondents highlighted the combination of the constant abuses of the security forces and their subsequent impunity as a possible reason for violent radicalization. They referred to the fact that, during this period and under the auspices of the fight against terrorism, the federal security forces began to employ the same illegal practices in the republic as those that they had used in Chechnya (HRW 1995). In one of the interviews, a Memorial activist illustrated the situation as follows:

> Since the start of the Second Chechen War, Chechen citizens have sought refuge in Ingushetia (…) [in 2002] the federal security forces began to carry out *zachistkas* (mopping-up operations) in Chechen and Ingush territory, in the places were the displaced persons were located. These operations [in Ingushetia] often claimed completely innocent victims, including both displaced persons and locals. Without offering any explanation, people wearing military uniforms and masks would burst into homes and take people away. The kidnapping victims either disappeared or were found dead.

This account is very similar to the one offered by a Chechen journalist who was working in Ingushetia at that time.

> To a large extent, the violent radicalization was due to the fact that the Russian security forces began to replicate in Ingushetia the practices already used in Chechnya: kidnappings, fabrication of criminal cases and killings on the pretext of fighting the insurgency. That is why not only federal forces were used but also local police forces, who began to receive bonuses—the so-called *cherezvichaiki*—and other payments to fight, which motivated them to take part in these operations.

The impunity with which the security forces acted during that period constituted a fundamental breach of the rule of law. According to the minutes of one of the most recent APPG meeting on the Rule of Law (APPGRL 2015), "the rule of law aims to shift the arbitrary exercise of power to accountable decision-making", and one of its principles is "no person being above the law". The systematic breach of this principle in Ingushetia during the period 2002–2008 affected all the republic's government structures and may well have been a push factor for some young people:



Figure 2. Why did the violence increase during 2002–2008?

> The main reason is the impunity of power. Zyazikov came to power through fraudulent elections, and this fraud was mainly committed by special service agents. Impunity; the arbitrary actions of the civil service, intelligence services and security forces; mass human rights violations; the lack of opportunity to exercise the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitution; high levels of corruption (…). All of these factors have created discontent among young people (…). This led lots of young people to take up arms.

The quest for vengeance as a push factor leading to violent radicalization was echoed by other respondents. As a matter of fact, the study carried out by Ratelle and Souleimanov (2017) in Dagestan points to the custom of blood revenge as a decisive factor among the insurgents. This cause was also considered in Chechnya, both in the case of "regular" militants (Speckhard and Ahkmedova 2006), and that of the so-called "black widows", female suicide bombers who had lost close relatives (Janeczko 2014). As another respondent explained, "many young people joined the insurgency because they saw it as the only way to defend themselves, especially all those young lads with close relatives who had been victims of some special operation."

In short, revenge has been one of the main causes behind the emergence of most of the insurgencies (Byman 2013), as well as also forming part of the traditional rhetoric of political Islam (Rogan 2010). However, in the North Caucasus there are also cultural reasons behind violent revenge, as one of the respondents pointed out:

> Since all these abuses took place in the Caucasus, where violence against a person, especially murder, demands revenge, groups of young people intent on settling scores with the offenders soon sprang up. Attacks began to take place on police officers who, together with members of the federal forces, had taken part in the killings and kidnappings.

In contrast, a minority of the respondents attributed the violent radicalization in Ingushetia to purely religious causes. In this respect, two of them defined the religious element as an instrument used by radicalized agents to recruit "angry, inexperienced and frustrated young men." These arguments were based on the logic that "people need some sort of defense, some basic protection, which they may find in religion," and that, faced with this situation, "young people from families who had been the victims of the arbitrariness of the structures of power became obsessed with revenge, a circumstance that could be easily exploited by unscrupulous religious leaders," something that, as already seen in Ingushetia, occurred with preachers and guerrilla fighters such as Gorchkhanov, Magas and Buryatsky.[6]

> Given this situation [poor living conditions], religion began to present itself as the only alternative to non-existent justice. Young people, mobilized by the insurgency more than any other age group, above all due to their inexperience, fell under the influence of those who were having moral authority (…). Young people, who are naive and don't have a strong knowledge of religion, end up believing the stories told by those who promise them paradise.

Similarly, one respondent stated that religion, specifically Salafism, was a driving force in violent radicalization and not merely an instrument in the hands of manipulators. One reason that may explain why this view was not more widely held is the fact that the person who voiced it, a Russian journalist specializing in the Caucasus, was one of the few respondents who was neither a native or resident of Ingushetia nor a Muslim.[7]

> When the USSR fell, borders fell with it, and thousands of people from the Caucasus had access to Islamic teaching from abroad. Above all, young people travelled abroad to study. At that time not many people knew about these fundamentalist strands of Islam, and some of these students were swayed by the propagandists of the most radical forms of Islam. They took this new Islam back home with them. The security forces had no in-depth knowledge of this at the time either and put pressure on all those who professed the "new Islam", without making any distinction between peaceful and violent fundamentalists. Abuses took place and this possibly triggered responses such as "since they killed his father or brother, he took up arms." The radical preachers in the forests exploited this motive, it suited them. (…) But, I insist: the main reason for radicalization was precisely the fact that a radical strand of Islam was brought in from Egypt and Saudi Arabia that was not really compatible with a peaceful way of life.

Fortunately, it seems that those days are over. Not only is this borne out by the statistics which show a significant reduction in violence, but also by the fact that all the respondents claimed that young people in Ingushetia did not "head to the forests" any more. And those who have followed this path in recent times have done so in order to fight in Syria, in some cases – according to the respondents – with the complicity of members of the security forces who have "provided them with a foreign passport" and "they won't be able to come back because they'll end up serving long prison sentences for belonging to a terrorist group abroad."

In this regard, according to Ratelle (2016) there have been two migratory waves of militants from the North Caucasus to Syria or Iraq: the first involving experienced guerrillas who, unable to carry on the fight back home, regard their exodus as a breathing space or training opportunity until they are able to return; and the second, made up of young people directly radicalized by the Islamic State project. Thus, the argument that there are currently less signs of radicalization should be qualified somewhat, and the possibility that the militants simply cannot or do want to continue fighting in Ingushetia should be taken into consideration.

As of 2009, one year after Yevkurov came to power, the situation gradually began to improve thanks to his direct intervention, as seen above, in an attempt to reinsert repentant insurgents in society and to focus military operations on the guerrilla leaders rather than on their support networks or relatives. Most of the respondents acknowledged the President's commitment to correcting many of the mistakes made by his predecessor Zyazikov. Nevertheless, they mentioned two drawbacks that have had a negative impact on his governance: on the one hand, he has barely managed to reduce institutional corruption – another feature of the lack of rule of law – (APPGRL 2015) and, on the other, failed to eradicate completely the abuses of the security forces, since they report directly and exclusively to Moscow.

Since "much remains to be done", the respondents expressed their opinion on the measures that the government should take to reduce violent radicalization even further (Figure 3). In relation to the aforementioned problems, some of them demanded effective equality before the law and respect for human rights. According to a local lawyer, "first of all the authorities must obey the letter of the law. And everyone must be equal before the law; criminals must be punished regardless of their social position or status." By the same token, the Chechen journalist thought that "the recipe is simple" and argued for the need for "a return to the rule of law, respect for human rights, including in terms of religious preferences. And then the implementation of changes across Russia, including holding



Figure 3. Measures to improve the situation.

elections again to elect the authorities at every level." He was referring to what others have called the "power vertical" (Gel'man and Ryzhenkov 2011), the institutional reform introduced by Vladimir Putin through which local governments ceased to be elected by universal suffrage in 2004.

Two of the respondents, the Ingush citizen living in Europe and the Russian journalist, underlined the need to achieve full equality before the law in religious conflicts, considering that there are strands of Islam of which the authorities are less tolerant and with which it is necessary to establish a dialogue. The idea was expressed by another respondent in layman's terms: "The authorities must create normal conditions for civil society and political opposition to exist and develop. The persecution of those who do not agree with the authorities is unacceptable."

However, many of the respondents also pointed to improvements in the socioeconomic situation and employment as one of the solutions to violent radicalization – and the lack of progress in this respect as one of its causes. A pensioner summed up this feeling: "Less stealing from the budget and more job creation for young people." Similarly, an inhabitant of Magas considered that "the fact that they're not occupied [young people]" and "can't earn money" hinders peace initiatives.

This study still contains some inconclusive aspects that may be developed in future research. As has been argued above, the testimonies of 31 citizens with some connection to Ingushetia constitute an interesting empirical dataset but cannot be considered representative. Furthermore, and for easily understandable reasons, it has been impossible to include other profiles which would have enriched the study and distanced it from the mere realm of perceptions: fighters, ex-fighters and members of the security forces did not respond to the researchers' requests. Last of all, although the study questionnaire is based on the one used by the UN (2016) in its related reports, several of its categories are compatible – sometimes redundant – with the one defended here, namely the lack of rule of law, which means that there are more reasons that support the thesis put forward here than those that contradict it.

Conclusions

The aim of this paper is not to draw generalizable conclusions but rather to provide empirical data that support the discussion on the Islamization of radicalism in the context of Ingushetia. According to the respondents, the main reasons for this violent

extremism were the lack of transparency in the affairs of the state, the impunity enjoyed by law enforcement officers with respect to their abusive behaviour, poor governance and corruption and, to a lesser extent, unemployment and the religious factor. Indeed, the first causes can be grouped together under the general heading of "lack of rule of law", the scope of which has already been defined here.

Therefore, it is possible to deduce a greater tendency among ordinary Ingush people involved in one way or another in the conflict to identify the structural causes of violent radicalization rather than the individual ones, such as the robust recruitment tactics of organizations like the CE and the Islamic State, the influence of friends or family members (Coolsaet 2016), the charisma of the preachers and the Salafist ideology itself.[8] In other words, it is not without reason that radicalization is blamed more often on the system than on individuals, although it is also attributed to a possible religious or emotional bias that facilitates victimization for contextual and impersonal reasons. It should be considered that, even though interviews as an ethnographic technique provide very valuable material, they can also be manipulated by the respondents (Spradley 2016).

Thus, to attain a sustainable peace, the governments of Russia and Ingushetia need to address legitimate grievances, tackling the local causes of the violence. Even more so when considering that, as Gerber and Mendelson (2009) suggest, those governments unconcerned with the local causes of violence are less likely to prevent radicalization.

The respondents in this study shared their perspective from within the spiral of violence that shook the republic between 2002 and 2008. With a view to the pacification of the region, they put forward a set of measures closely related to strengthening the rule of law, such as its consolidation and the fight against corruption. They also proposed other measures of a socioeconomic nature.

To date, the current government of Ingushetia has managed to reduce the climate of violence that peaked in 2008, although it cannot be ruled out that some militants simply decided to emigrate to other theatres of war. Some of the reasons for this include a combination of "hard measures" against the leadership of insurgent groups and "soft measures" such as the setting up of peace policies. This combination is described by Aly, Balbi, and Jacques (2015) as "smart CVE".

However, this "smart CVE" cannot be interpreted as a sort of "magic formula" for combating radicalization, since depending on many factors, including institutional robustness, the relationship between the administration and civil society, the available resources and the cultural idiosyncrasies of the contexts in which they are applied, they can yield disparate results, as can be seen in Dagestan, Chechnya and Kabardino-Balkaria (Koehler, Gunya, and Alkhazurov 2016). Nevertheless, some aspects, such as corruption, have yet to be resolved, while others, such as legal impunity in cases of torture, enforced disappearances and killings, do not fall under the remit of the local government but rather under that of the federal authorities.

Notes

1. An Islamic revival that had commenced years before and which several studies attributes to its close historical ties with Middle Eastern currents (Moore and Tumelty 2008). According to this vision, after the Soviet period it led to a thriving Salafi community in some areas of the

republic (Ibragimov and Matsuzato 2014), which would become the vanguard of the internal radicalization and its spread to neighbouring Chechnya (McGregor 2012).

2. According to the UN (2016), there is a stronger correlation between violent radicalization and frustration stemming from the lack of rule of law, than between radicalization and poverty or unemployment. Other studies of the North Caucasus that associate this phenomenon with other structural aspects include Ware and Kisriev (2009) and Ratelle (2013).
3. In a later research (Sagramoso and Yarlykapov 2013), the authors added other structural causes as push factors, some pertaining to the lack of rule of law: the perpetuation of corrupt ruling elites; the absence of political pluralism; severe economic hardship; youth unemployment; and high levels of income inequality.
4. In North Caucasus republics, preservation of honour is one of the basic pillars on which these societies are built and the inability to avenge oneself after an offense is seen as a sign of weakness not only for an individual, but also for the whole clan (Ratelle and Souleimanov 2017).
5. See Annex 1.
6. It should be noted that this opinion is like the one expressed by Colonel-General Anatoly Safonov, attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Rightly or wrongly, we tried to sort the matter out at the beginning, tackling the extremists head on. However, we forgot that other methods of treatment exist in addition to surgery. Figuratively speaking, it is necessary to make a thorough diagnosis, at the same time carrying out a therapy involving hygienists, epidemiologists … Education, religion and culture must be linked together. Technical-military measures must only target the top of the pyramid; that is to say, the combatants. A different approach must be adopted with their support networks. After all, we must not hide the fact that people often head into the forest to join the insurgents not under the influence of Salafism but rather as a sign of social protest and because they simply cannot obtain justice through legal means" (Kurer, 25 May 2011).
7. She also placed the "religious factor" at the top of the list in the questionnaire.
8. Although, there would seem to be a polarization between the hegemonic stances defended by the media attributing the radicalization process solely to religious factors, and those defended by the academic literature which inversely only considers the socioeconomic and political factors, violent radicalization appears to be a more complex phenomenon that should be studied more comprehensively by also bearing in mind historical, ethnic and identity factors, among others (Alao 2013).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

References

Alao, Abiodun. 2013. "Islamic Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Nigeria." *Conflict, Security & Development* 13 (2): 127–147.

Alba Rico, Santiago. 2015. *Islamofobia: nosotros, los otros, el miedo*. Barcelona: Icaria.

All-Party Parliamentary Group on the Rule of Law. 2015. *Meeting Report: Non-Violent Extremism and the Rule of Law*. http://www.biicl.org/documents/744_unattributed_report_on_14_july_2015_appg_on_the_rule_of_law_meeting.pdf?showdocument=1.

Aly, Anne, Anne-Marie Balbi, and Carmen Jacques. 2015. "Rethinking Countering Violent Extremism: Implementing the Role of Civil Society." *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 10 (1): 3–13.

Bartlett, Jamie, and Carl Miller. 2012. "The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24 (1): 1–21.

Burgess, Paul. 2017. "The Rule of Law: Beyond Contestedness." *Jurisprudence* 8 (3): 480–500.

Byman, Daniel. 2013. "Fighting Salafi-Jihadist Insurgencies: How Much Does Religion Really Matter?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 36 (5): 353–371.

Campana, Aurelie, and Jean-Francois Ratelle. 2014. "A Political Sociology Approach to the Diffusion of Conflict from Chechnya to Dagestan and Ingushetia." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 37 (2): 115–134.
Carlin, Ryan E. 2012. "Rule-of-Law Typologies in Contemporary Societies." *Justice System Journal* 33 (2): 154–173.
Coolsaet, Rick. 2016. "All Radical is Local. The Genesis and Drawbacks of an Elusive Concept." *Egmont Paper* 84: 1–48.
Dzutsati, Valery. 2012. "Russian Security Services Erase Role of Magas in 2004 Beslan Attack." *North Caucasus Analysis* 13 (4). https://jamestown.org/program/russian-security-services-erase-role-of-magas-in-2004-beslan-attack-2/.
Fagan, Geraldine. 2014. "A Word of Justice: Islam and State Repression in the North-West Caucasus." *Central Asian Survey* 33 (1): 29–46.
Galeotti, Mark. 2014. *Russia's Wars in Chechnya (1994-2009)*. Oxford: Osprey.
Garner, George. 2013. "Chechnya and Kashmir: The Jihadist Evolution of Nationalism to Jihad and Beyond." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25 (3): 419–434.
Gazeta. 2015. "Там гражданская война, как и на Украине." May 8. https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2015/08/05_a_7669209.shtml.
Gel'man, Vladimir, and Sergei Ryzhenkov. 2011. "Local Regimes, Sub-National Governance and the 'Power Vertical' in Contemporary Russia." *Europe-Asia Studies* 63 (3): 449–465.
Gerber, Theodore P., and Sarah E. Mendelson. 2009. "Security through Sociology: The North Caucasus and the Global Counterinsurgency Paradigm." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32 (9): 831–851.
Ghosh, Ratna, Wing Yu Alice Chan, Ashley Manuel, and Maihemuti Dilimulati. 2017. "Can Education Counter Violent Religious Extremism?" *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 23 (2): 117–133.
Gielen, Amy-Jane. 2017. "Countering Violent Extremism: A Realist Review for Assessing What Works, for Whom, in What Circumstances, and How?" *Terrorism and Political Violence*. doi: 10.1080/09546553.2017.1313736.
Hahn, Gordon M. 2008. "The Jihadi Insurgency and the Russian Counterinsurgency in the North Caucasus." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 24 (1): 1–39.
Heydemann, Steven. 2014. "Countering Violent Extremism as a Field of Practice." *Insights* 1.
HRW. 1995. "Report Russia's War in Chechnya: Victims Speak Out." http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/Russia.htm.
HRW. 2008. "Russia: Stop 'Dirty War' Tactics in Ingushetia: Killings, Torture, Disappearances in Chechnya-Style Counterinsurgency." https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/06/24/russia-stop-dirty-war-tactics-ingushetia.
Ibragimov, Magomed-Rusul, and Kimitaka Matsuzato. 2014. "Contextualized Violence: Politics and Terror in Dagestan." *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 42 (2): 286–306.
IISS. 2008. "Insurgency in Ingushetia." *Strategic Comments* 14 (6): 1–2.
Interfax. 2008. "Новый президент Ингушетии встретился с оппозицией." November 4. http://www.interfax.ru/russia/43487.
International Crisis Group. 2012. "The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (II), Islam, the Insurgency and Counter-insurgency." *Europe Report* 211 (19). http://old.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/north-caucasus/221-the-north-caucasus-the-challenges-of-integration-ii-islam-the-insurgency-and-counter-insurgency.html.
International Crisis Group. 2013. "The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (III), Governance, Elections, Rule of Law." *Europe Report* 226. https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/23516/uploads.
Janeczko, Matthew. 2014. "'Faced with Death, Even a Mouse Bites': Social and Religious Motivations Behind Terrorism in Chechnya." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 25 (2): 428–456.
Kavkaz Uzel. 2012. "Evkurov: Some of the Abductions Occurring in Ingushetia Are a Feint or 'Contract' with Members of Power Ministries." June 13. http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/21289/.

Kavkaz Uzel. 2016. "The Statistics of the Number of Victims in the North Caucasian Federal District Regions for the Period of 6 Years." http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/statistics_victims_2010_2015.html?l=en.

Kenney, Michael. 2011. "Hotbed of Radicalization or Something Else?: An Ethnographic Exploration of a Muslim Neighborhood in Ceuta." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23 (4): 537–559.

King, Michael, and Donald M. Taylor. 2011. "The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists: A Review of Theoretical Models and Social Psychological Evidence." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23 (4): 602–622.

Kisriev, Enver, and Robert B. Ware. 2005. "Russian Hegemony in Dagestan." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 21 (1): 26–55.

Koehler, Jan, Alexey Gunya, and Magomed Alkhazurov. 2016. "Insurgency-informed Governance in the North Caucasus: Observations from Chechnya, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27 (3): 367–391.

Kommersant. 2009. "Президент Ингушетии останавливает кровников." January 16. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1119462.

Kuchins, Andrew, Matthew Malarkey, and Sergey Markedonov. 2011. *The North Caucasus: Russia's Volatile Frontier*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Kurbanov, Ruslan. 2011. "'Urban' and 'Rural' Islam in the Caucasus: Modernisation versus Conservation." *Religion, State and Society* 39 (2-3): 347–365.

Kurer, Voenno-Promishelni. 2011. "Las Fuerzas Armadas rusas, sobre el terrorismo." *Txetxènia.org*, May 27. http://pagines.dyndns.org:8801/txetxenia/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=976:les-forces-armades-russes-sobre-el-terrorisme-&catid=97:insurgencia-armada&Itemid=64&lang=es.

Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. 1987. *Hegemonía y estrategia socialista. Hacia una radicalización de la democracia*. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Leahy, Daniel Kevin. 2010. "From Racketeer to Emir: A Political Portrait of Doku Umarov, Russia's Most Wanted Man." *Caucasian Review of International Affairs* 4 (3): 248–270.

Malashenko, Aleksei, and Akhmed Yarlykapov. 2009. "Radicalisation of Russia's Muslim Community." *MICROCON Policy Working Paper* 9.

Markedonov, Sergey. 2011. "Causes of the Growing Instability in Kabardino-Balkaria and Ways of Overcoming It." *Anthropology & Archeology of Eurasia* 49 (4): 72–81.

McCarthy, Stephen, and Kheang Un. 2017. "The Evolution of Rule of Law in Cambodia." *Democratization* 24 (1): 100–118.

McCauley, Clark, and Sophia Moskalenko. 2008. "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20 (3): 415–433.

McGregor, Andrew. 2006. *Military Jama'ats in the North Caucasus: A Continuing Threat*. Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation.

McGregor, Andrew. 2012. "Military Jamaats in the North Caucasus: A Continuing Threat." In *Volatile Borderland: Russia and the North Caucasus*, edited by Glen E. Howard, 237–264. Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation.

Memorial. 2005. "A Conveyer of Violence Human Rights Violations during Anti-Terrorist Operations in the Republic of Ingushetia." http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/N-Caucas/konnas/eng/index.htm.

Memorial. 2008. "Встреча президента Ингушетии с родственниками похищенных, убитых и осужденных жителей республики." December 2. http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/msg/2008/12/m155367.htm.

Memorial. 2009. "Встреча Президента Республики Ингушетия с руководителями силовых ведомств, общественными организациями и родственниками похищенных и убитых жителей республики." June 10. http://www.memo.ru/d/3570.html.

Memorial. 2010. "Дело Муцольгова." January 30. http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/msg/2010/01/m192418.htm.

Moore, Cerwyn. 2012. "Suicide Bombing: Chechnya, the North Caucasus and Martyrdom." *Europe-Asia Studies* 64 (9): 1780–1807.

Moore, Cerwyn, and Paul Tumelty. 2008. "Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 31: 412–433.
O'Loughlin, John, Edward C. Holland, and Frank D. Witmer. 2011. "The Changing Geography of Violence in Russia's North Caucasus, 1999-2011: Regional Trends and Local Dynamics in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria." *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 52 (5): 596–630.
Peerenboom, Randall. 2003. "A Government of Laws: Democracy, Rule of Law and Administrative Law Reform in the PRC." *Journal of Contemporary China* 12 (34): 45–67.
Pisoiu, Daniela. 2013. "Coming to Believe 'Truths' About Islamist Radicalization in Europe." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25 (2): 246–263.
Pokalova, Elena. 2015. *Chechnya's Terrorist Network: The Evolution of Terrorism in Russia's North Caucasus*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
Pokalova, Elena. 2017. "Islamic Radicalization in Russia's North Caucasus: Lessons from Russia's Handling of Religious Revival." *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*. doi:10.1080/19448953.2017.1367587.
Ratelle, Jean-Francois. 2013. "Radical Islam and the Chechen War Spillover: A Political Ethnographic Reassessment of the Upsurge of Violence in the North Caucasus since 2009." PhD Thesis, University of Ottawa, Ottawa.
Ratelle, Jean-Francois. 2016. "North Caucasian Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Assessing the Threat of Returnees to the Russian Federation." *Caucasus Survey* 4 (3): 218–238.
Ratelle, Jean-Francois, and Emil Souleimanov. 2017. "Retaliation in Rebellion: The Missing Link to Explaining Insurgent Violence in Dagestan." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 29 (4): 573–592.
Rivas Otero, José Manuel, and Adrián Tarín Sanz. 2017. "Leadership Style and War and Peace Policies in the Context of Armed Conflict: The Case of Maskhadov and Umarov." *Problems of Post-Communism* 64 (1): 1–19.
Rogan, Randall G. 2010. "Jihad against Infidels and Democracy: A Frame Analysis of Jihadist Ideology and Jurisprudence for Martyrdom and Violent Jihad." *Communication Monographs* 77 (3): 393–413.
Rosstat. 2016. *Report on Employment and Unemployment in the Russian Federation of January 2016*. http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d06/37.htm.
Roy, Oliver. 2007. "Islamic Terrorist Radicalisation in Europe." In *European Islam: Challenges for Society and Public Policy*, edited by Samir Amghhar, Amel Boubekeur, and Michael Emerson, 52–60. Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies.
Roy, Oliver. 2016. "The Islamization of Radicalism." *Mada Masr*, January 11. http://www.madamasr.com/opinion/islamization-radicalism.
Sagramoso, Domitilla. 2007. "Violence and Conflict in the Russian North Caucasus." *International Affairs* 83 (4): 681–705.
Sagramoso, Domitilla. 2012. "The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus: Moving Closer to the Global Jihadist Movement?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 64 (3): 561–595.
Sagramoso, Domitilla, and Akhmet Yarlykapov. 2013. "Caucasian Crescent: Russia's Islamic Policies and Its Responses to Radicalization." In *The Fire Below: How the Caucasus Shaped Russia*, edited by Robert B. Ware, 51–94. New York: Bloomsbury.
Schaefer, Robert. 2010. *The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
Sedgwick, Mark. 2010. "The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22 (4): 479–494.
Shterin, Marat, and Akhmet Yarlykapov. 2011. "Reconsidering Radicalisation and Terrorism: The New Muslims Movement in Kabardino-Balkaria and Its Path to Violence." *Religion, State and Society* 39 (2-3): 303–325.
Sirseloudi, Matenia. 2012. "The Meaning of Religion and Identity for the Violent Radicalisation of the Turkish Diaspora in Germany." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24 (5): 807–824.
Sokirianskaya, Ekaterina. 2004. "Getting Back Home? Towards Sustainable Return of Ingush Forced Migrants and Lasting Peace in Prigorodny District of North Ossetia." http://www.policy.hu/sokirianskaia/research.html.

Sotkasiira, Tiina. 2016. *Russian Borderlands in Change. North Caucasian Youth and the Politics of Bordering and Citizenship*. London: Routledge.
Speckhard, Anne, and Khapta Ahkmedova. 2006. "The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29 (5): 429–492.
Spradley, James P. 2016. *The Ethnographic Interview*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
Tarín Sanz, Adrián. 2017. *La yihad en Rusia*. Barcelona: Icaria.
Ter, Marta. 2016. "Radicalism Thrives Among Exploited Migrant Workers in Russia." *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 13 (98).
UN. 2016. *Preventing Violent Extremism through Inclusive Development and the Promotion of Tolerance and Respect for Diversity*. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/conflict-prevention/discussion-paper---preventing-violent-extremism-through-inclusiv.html.
Vachagaev, Mairbek. 2017. "Radikalniy islam v Chechne." In *Islamskie radikalnye dvizheniya na politicheskoy karte sovremennogo mira: Severniy I Yuzhniy Kavkaz*, edited by A. D. Savateev, 27–45. Moscow: Institut Afriki RAN.
Ware, Robert B., and Enver Kisriev. 2009. *Dagestan: Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance in the North Caucasus*. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
Weine, Stevan. 2012. "Building Resilience to Violent Extremism in Muslim Diaspora Communities in the United States." *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways Toward Terrorism and Genocide* 5 (1): 60–73.
Weine, Stevan, David P. Eisenman, Janni Kinsler, Deborah C. Glik, and Chloe Polutnik. 2017. "Addressing Violent Extremism as Public Health Policy and Practice." *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 9: 208–221.
Weine, Stevan, Schuyler Henderson, Stephen Shanfield, Rupinder Legha, and Jerrold Post. 2013. "Building Community Resilience to Counter Violent Extremism." *Democracy and Security* 9 (4): 327–333.
Wesley, Robert. 2008. "Combating Terrorism through a Counter-Framing Strategy." *CTC Sentinel* 1: 10–12.
Williams, Michael J., John G. Horgan, and William P. Evans. 2016. "The Critical Role of Friends in Networks for Countering Violent Extremism: Toward a Theory of Vicarious Help-Seeking." *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 8 (1): 45–65.
Yarlykapov, Akhmet. 2010. "The Radicalization of North Caucasian Muslims." In *Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism*, edited by Roland Dannreuther, and Luke March, 137–154. New York: Routledge.
Zaprava. 2008. "Юнус-бек Евкуров встретился с представителями." November 26. http://zaprava.ru/200811261660.

Annex 1

Не могли бы Вы дать свой ответ на приведенные ниже вопросы? Это анонимный опросник, и ответы на него послужат материалом для научной статьи о факторах, влияющих на радикализацию молодых людей в Ингушетии. Я заранее очень благодарю Вас за сотрудничество.

1. Как Вы считаете, почему за период между 2002–2008 годами в Ингушетии возросли случаи насильственного экстремизма?
2. Как Вы считаете, почему юноши присоединялись к вооруженному подполью, уходили в лес?
3. Пожалуйста, расставьте в порядке важности факторы (1–6), которые, по Вашему мнению, вносят / внесли самый большой вклад в радикалицазию молодежи в республике:

чувство несправедливости
нарушения прав человека

отсутствие законности
исключение из общественной и политической жизни
широко распространенная коррупция
религиозные факторы

4. Пожалуйста, оцените, каким образом справлялись с конфликтом правительства Зязикова и Евкурова.
5. Как Вы думаете, какие шаги необходимо предпринять в республике и по всему Кавказу в целом, чтобы радикализация молодежи прекратилась?

Could you please answer the following questions? The answers will be used to write an academic article on factors of radicalization among young people in Ingushetia. Many thanks in advance for your cooperation.

1. Why do you think that between 2002 and 2008 there was an increase in violent extremism in Ingushetia?
2. In your opinion, for what reasons did young men join the armed insurgency, why did they «head to the forests»?
3. Please, order by importance (1–6) the factors you believe most contribute / contributed to the radicalization of young people in the republic:

perceptions of injustice
human rights violations
lack of rule of law
social-political exclusion
widespread corruption
religion

4. Please, give an assessment of how the governments of Zyazikov and Yevkurov managed conflict during their terms in office.
5. What steps do you think should be taken in the Ingushetia Republic and in the Caucasus in general to end the violent radicalization of young people?