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Developmental equilibrium selection

dc.contributor.authorBrañas Garza, Pablo Ernesto 
dc.contributor.authorLomas, Pablo
dc.date.accessioned2023-12-19T13:45:56Z
dc.date.available2023-12-19T13:45:56Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.citationBrañas Garza P, et al. Developmental equilibrium selection. (2023)es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12412/4833
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies whether using Payoff dominance is more or less natural than Risk dominance through a sample of more than a thousand of preadolescents and teenagers (n = 1, 254 , av.age = 12.8, 48%female). Participants in two coordination games (within-subjects) were asked to select a strategy but also to state a reason explaining their choice. They also completed a CRT, a short financial quiz and a risk decision task. Using both the strategies chosen by the participants and their arguments, we determine whether they use payoffs or risk as devices to coordinate. Our research provides four main findings. First, using payoff dominance is more natural than risk dominance. Second, the use both devices is highly correlated with individual cognitive abilities. Third, strategic sophistication does not improve with age. Last, individual preferences for risk do not explain the use of risk dominance, and no gender differences were found. This evidence suggests that the acquisition of cognitive abilities provides essential skills that foster a greater capacity for strategic thinking. Finally, the analysis of chosen strategies without stated reasoning or vice versa provides the very same results.es
dc.language.isoenges
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.titleDevelopmental equilibrium selectiones
dc.typeotheres
dc.rights.accessRightsopenAccesses
dc.subject.keywordDevelopmental decision makinges
dc.subject.keywordCoordination gameses
dc.subject.keywordPayoffs-Risk dominancees
dc.subject.keywordCognitive abilitieses


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