Recognition and Trust: Hegel and Confucius on the Normative Basis of Ethical Life

Abstract

This essay offers a comparative analysis of the notion of trust in Hegel and Confucius. It shows that Hegel’s two senses of trust (Zutrauen and Vertrauen) depend upon his theory of recognition and recognitive struggle. The competitive thrust of Hegel’s account of trust, it argues, introduces a series of problems that cannot be adequately resolved within his theory, since it presupposes the kinds of trusting relations—self-, intersubjective- and world-trust—that it purports to explain. This essay then turns to the Confucian notions of xin 心and li理to address the problems in the Hegelian account. It concludes by outlining the Confucian account’s salience for critical social theory.

Es la versión preprint del artículo. Se puede consultar la versión final en https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-018-9644-4